The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, 1990 by Fry, Greg
394 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1991
The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, I990
By the beginning of 1990 the Cold War
concerns that had played such an
important part in the "internationaliza-
tion" of the South Pacific from the mid-
1980s had abated. Some observers of
South Pacific affairs argued that this
would mean a diminution of interest
on the part of the major powers and, as
a consequence, that Pacific Island
states would find it increasingly diffi-
cult to attract the level of economic
assistance they had grown used to
under Cold War conditions. Develop-
ments in the South Pacific during 1990
suggest, however, that these predic-
tions are unfounded. The region did
not revert to "backwater" status in the
eyes of the major powers. This was
partly because new rationales for
regional involvement were developed
in the light of changed circumstances,
and partly because of the continued
existence of long-standing objectives
unrelated to the East-West struggle.
Developments in the South Pacific con-
tinued to be seen by these larger coun-
tries as having the potential to affect
their global, or at least broader Asian-
Pacific, interests.
One of the most interesting and
important developments was the
increased attention accorded the South
Pacific in United States policy and the
suggestion that such attention was
becoming institutionalized. This was
interesting because it was happening at
a time when alarmism about Soviet
intentions in the region, and concern
about the vulnerability of the area to
Soviet entreaties, had declined from a
mid-decade high. It constituted, there-
fore, one of the strongest indications
that the end of the Cold War did not
mean an end to great power interest in
the South Pacific. It was important
because it suggested the institutionali-
zation of a direct and comprehensive
involvement in regional affairs by the
world's most powerful country for the
first time since the Second World War,
a development that changes the pat-
tern of regional politics in a fundamen-
tal way.
Two important landmarks in United
States policy in 1990 were the release of
the recommendations of the congres-
sional delegation to the South Pacific
(the Solarz Report) in May and Presi-
dent Bush's meeting with the leaders of
all Pacific Islands states in Honolulu in
November. The Solarz Report reflects
the stance of American policy toward
the broader Asian-Pacific region at this
time: While the Cold War may be over
in Europe there is as yet no indication
of a change in Soviet military capacity
in the Asian-Pacific region. Further,
there may be a return to a leadership
with a less benign foreign policy.
Therefore the United States' Pacific
policy must continue to counter Soviet
influence as well as prepare for the
post-Cold War period in the region. In
the post-Cold War era the Pacific
should remain an "American lake"-
one in which the United States plays
the role of "balancer," providing
regional order and stability. Forces
should continue to be forward
deployed, and access to facilities
throughout the region should be
sought.
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The Solarz Report may be seen
against the backdrop of this broader
policy approach and is a product of the
transition. It attempts to straddle two
eras-the Cold War and the post-Cold
War. Its emphasis on the need to com-
pete with Soviet influence in the South
Pacific should be seen in this light.
Equally important, it is a blueprint for
a post-Cold War United States
involvement in the South Pacific.
The Solarz Report signals a greater'
significance for the South Pacific
within the United States' broader
Pacific policy than existed during the
Cold War. The very existence of a con-
gressional report, and of a congres-
sional visit, indicates the new impor-
tance, particularly when the visit was
led by such an eminent congressman.
The recommendations confirm a trend
in United States thinking since 1985-
that the United States should have its
own regional policy and presence and
should not rely on others, namely Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, to represent
its interests. Consonant with this gen-
eral proposition, the report advocated
a more extensive diplomatic network,
a higher level of participation in the
South Pacific Commission, and a step-
ping up of United States educational
and economic programs. The impor-
tance of this report was reflected later
in the year, when many of its recom-
mendations were taken up by President
Bush in his meeting with Pacific Island
leaders.
The presidential summit, as it came
to be called, was unprecedented. This
was the first time that the leaders of
Pacific Island states had met as a group
with a president of the United States.
The symbolic importance of the occa-
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sion was not lost on those present. For
several years many Pacific Island lead-
ers had been seeking more direct
involvement by the United States in
South Pacific affairs and more direct
access for South Pacific states in Wash-
ington.
As Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry
of the Cook Islands said in his response
to the president on behalf of the assem-
bled leaders, "We in the Pacific have
tended to think your country is too far
away and too concerned with the prob-
lems of other places and you weren't as
interested in the problems of the people
of our region. You have changed that
quite considerably, single-handedly"
(SSB&A 28 Oct 90, B3).
While the symbolism was more
important than the substance of the
talks, the outcome of the meeting was
certainly not unimportant. The most
immediate issue of concern from the
point of view of the Pacific Island lead-
ers, was that of the proposed incinera-
tion of chemical weapons at Johnston
Atoll. The president "assured" the
Pacific leaders, "we plan to dispose of
only the chemical munitions from the
Pacific Theater currently stored at
Johnston Atoll, any obsolete materials
found in the Pacific Islands, and those
relatively small quantities shipped from
Germany.... Once the destruction is
completed we have no plans to use
Johnston Atoll for any other chemical
munitions purpose, or as a hazardous
waste disposal site" (SSB&A 28 Oct 90,
B3). On the face of it, this was a con-
cession to the strong Pacific Island
opposition to the use of Johnston Atoll
for chemical weapon incineration. The
United States would presumably have
preferred to keep its options open,
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knowing that there will be more weap-
ons to destroy and that there will be
considerable opposition to the use of
mainland sites. On the other hand, the
use of the phrase "no plans" permits a
change of mind in changed circum-
stances. From the American point of
view, this was a successful outcome
because the Pacific leaders reluctantly
accepted the existing program of
destruction of chemical weapons on
Johnston Atoll, whereas before the
meeting they had been strongly
opposed to it.
The president also used the occasion
to announce a number of new initia-
tives: the establishment of a Joint Com-
mercial Commission with the island
nations to identify and address com-
mercial opportunities and trade con-
cerns; a 1991 mission of American
investors to the South Pacific under the
leadership of the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation; plans to
begin negotiation to extend the South
Pacific Regional Fisheries Treaty; the
addition of Agency for International
Development private sector assistance
programs; and new educational
exchanges.
Superpower detente made it difficult
for the People's Republic of China
(PRC) to continue to use the need to
counter Soviet influence as a rationale
for its involvement in the South Pacific.
Yet, if anything, PRC interest in the
region continued to rise in 1990,
reflecting the more important and
unstated objectives of its South Pacific
policy: developing influence in the
broader Asian-Pacific region and com-
peting for influence, and ultimately for
diplomatic recognition, with Taiwan.
It also reflected the continuing interest
of Fiji's Interim Government in Chinese
economic and military assistance. In
April the PRC financed Major General
Rabuka's first overseas trip since the
1987 coups-a visit to Beijing (PIM,
May 1990, 7)·
For Taiwan, too, there was a step-
ping up of diplomatic activity in the
region in 1990, which may principally
be seen as a continuation of Taiwan's
efforts since the early 1970S to gain dip-
lomatic recognition in the region. Hav-
ing already succeeded on this score
with Tonga, Tuvalu, Nauru, and the
Solomon Islands, it concentrated its
efforts on expanding its links with
Tonga, opening an embassy in Nauru,
attempting to turn economic links into
diplomatic recognition in Vanuatu,
and seeking Dialogue Partner status
with the South Pacific Forum (PIM, Oct
1990 ,18).
Although it is in close economic
association with most Pacific Island
countries, Taiwan's fishing practices
continue to create strains in the rela-
tionship. In 1990, this mainly con-
cerned the involvement of Taiwanese
fishers in the gill-net fishing of albacore
tuna. Specific tensions arose with
Vanuatu when the Lini government
was reportedly irritated by the attempt
of Taiwan's trade representative to link
economic deals to diplomatic recogni-
tion (IB, Oct 1990, 4-1). The attempt
to gain Dialogue Partner status at the
Forum aroused the PRC, which had
already obtained that status. The PRC
warned that it would regard Taiwan's
accession to Dialogue Partner status as
acceptance by the Forum of a "Two
Chinas" policy and therefore unaccept-
able (Mangnall 1990a). The question
was put before a committee to report
to the next Forum.
The continuation of the Japanese
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regional involvement that had been
instituted in the Cold War context of
1985 to 1987 was confirmed in 1990.
Again, the lessening of concern about
Soviet intentions in the region, ostensi-
bly a major element in the launching of
the Kuranari Doctrine (which called
for an increased Japanese presence in
the region), did not result in a pull-
back in Japanese interest. Two devel-
opments in particular demonstrated a
desire for continued involvement in
regional affairs. One was the decision
to suspend gill-net fishing by Japanese
fishers in South Pacific waters as a
response to the strong concerns of
Pacific Island states. This was a major
concession. The other was the
announcement by the observer for the
Japanese government to the South
Pacific Commission's annual confer-
ence in Noumea in October that Japan
was interested in becoming a member.
He indicated that Japan could not give
financial assistance to an organization
of which it was not a member. This
was a significant step. Although Japan
had indicated an interest in member-
ship since 1987 this had previously been
communicated through Pacific Island
countries that supported its case. This
was the first time Japan had explicitly
stated its desire to be admitted as a
member.
Nevertheless, some tensions
remained in Japan-Pacific Islands rela-
tions over the continuing reluctance of
the Japanese government to enter a
regional agreement on fisheries access
similar to that reached with the Ameri-
cans in 1987.
Events of 1990 indicated that for
France, too, the transition to the post-
Cold War era made no difference to its
desire to be engaged in South Pacific
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regional politics. The only change was
the dropping of Cold War justifications
for its presence. The substantive objec-
tives of French policy remained. The
year was marked by an increase in
French involvement in the region out-
side its own territories: the opening up
of French regional universities to stu-
dents from other countries in the South
Pacific, the forging of closer relations
with Vanuatu spurred by the Lini gov-
ernment's desire to redress what it
claimed to be the damage done to these
relations by Barak Sope, the establish-
ment of assistance with maritime sur-
veillance for Fiji and the Cook Islands,
and the normalization of relations with
Australia (PR, 30 Aug 1990, 4; 5July
199°,2; 16 Aug 1990, 6). General
Rabuka also announced the possibility
of French assistance with US$7.7 mil-
lion for a maintenance workshop for
the Fiji military and hinted at the possi-
bility of a defense pact with France
(PIM, May 199°,7; Aug 1990, 14)·
The French South Pacific Council
meeting in May in Pape'ete included
President Mitterrand, Prime Minister
Rocard and seven ministers of the
French Cabinet. After the meeting,
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister
Edwidge Avice claimed in a public
statement that the policies of the
Socialist government had led to "a very
clear improvement of France's situa-
tion in the South Pacific" (PR, 7 June
1990,6). Nevertheless, there were still
some indications of tension in France's
relations with the region in 1990. The
South Pacific Forum decided to take up
the concerns of the Front de Liberation
Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS)
that the Forum should oversee progress
under the Matignon Accords in New
Caledonia. However, the Forum's deci-
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sion to send a delegation to New Cale-
donia was thwarted by the French
authorities. The decolonization issue
was also kept alive by the Solomon
Islands government, which pressed at
the United Nations for the listing of
French Polynesia with the UN Decolo-
nization Committee (PR, II Oct 1990,
3). And at the South Pacific Conference
in October, Pacific Island delegates
were unhappy with the French attempt
to move the headquarters of the organ-
ization to make way for tourism devel-
opment.
Australia's policy approach to the
South Pacific in 1990 was based on
recently revised assumptions about the
region following the end of the Cold
War, and the internal political turmoil
in Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New
Guinea in the late 1980s. The assump-
tions were that the Soviet Union was
no longer a threat; that the security
problem of the future was internal and
related to development rather than an
external threat; and that Pacific Island
societies are complex and diverse and
should be respected as independent
players in regional politics instead of
being treated as manipulable agents of
foreign influence. Reflecting this shift
in assumptions were some significant
changes in the doctrine guiding Austra-
lia's South Pacific policy. The attempt
to deny the Soviet Union any influence
in the region was replaced by the policy
objective of denying unconstructive
involvement on the part of any external
power (and welcoming constructive
Soviet involvement). Australia's role as
agent for Western interests was to be
eschewed in favor of identifying with
the region in a policy of "constructive
commitment"-a "partnership" role
involving respect for the sovereignty of
Pacific Island states.
Much of this rethinking was forma-
lized in the Ministerial Statement on
Australia's Regional Security released
late in 1989 (Evans 1989). However,
events of 1990 revealed that the new
approach had a number of internal ten-
sions and that, for Pacific Island states,
its central claims of respect for sover-
eignty and a commitment to noninter-
ference seemed to sit oddly with the
implementation of Australian policy.
An important tension in the new
policy approach existed in relation to
the promotion of "regional order"
objectives, on the one hand, and the
promotion of human rights and
democracy on the other. This surfaced
in the context of Australia's attitude to
Fiji. It appeared that Australia was
running two policies in 1990, one mov-
ing toward normalization of relations,
the other putting international pressure
on Fiji to move away from a racially
based constitution. The former was
represented in Prime Minister Hawke's
reported conciliatory remarks about
the Fiji constitution to the press after
talking with Ratu Mara at the South
Pacific Forum, and the latter by Sena-
tor Evans' criticisms of the Fiji consti-
tution as being racially based during a
speech at the United Nations. Senator
Evans was accused by Ratu Mara of
interference in Fiji's internal affairs and
was told he would be unwelcome in Fiji
during his upcoming tour of the South
Pacific (see Mangnall 1990b; SMH, 30
Oct 1990, 9; Grigson 1990, 3)·
The low point in Australia's rela-
tions with the Pacific Island states as a
group occurred at the South Pacific
Forum in August, when the issue of the
"".
POLITICAL REVIEW. THE REGION
." , " ,
399
United States' intention to burn chemi-
cal weapons at Johnston Island was
discussed. Australia was seen as repre-
senting American interests, being
uncompromising in its attitudes, being
manipulative in its approach, and its
Prime Minister as being abrasive in
style.
Although preoccupied with domes-
tic economic and political difficulties,
New Zealand's Labour government
also engaged in a reassessment of its
policy approach to the region during
the year. The report of the South
Pacific Policy Review Group (Towards
a Pacific Island Community, 1990),
released in May, was the major contri-
bution to this process. In its own
words, the report is about "coming to
terms with our neighbourhood, and
New Zealand's place as one of a com-
munity of Pacific Island countries" (I).
Specific recommendations included the
opening of new diplomatic posts, the
establishment of a Pacific parliamen-
tary association as a step toward a
Pacific parliament, examination of the
possibility of creating a Pacific free
trade area, the adoption of a "coordi-
nated and comprehensive approach"
toward meeting the security concerns
of the Pacific Island region, and contin-
uance of traditional levels of Pacific
Island immigration. Probably the most
contentious recommendations con-
cerned New Zealand's relations with
Fiji: that regular ministerial contact
and Royal New Zealand Air Force sur-
veillance flights be restored.
A change of government occurred
before any comprehensive response to
the review was announced by the
Labour government. Based on other
policy pronouncements, it is clear that
the Palmer government accepted, at
least at a rhetorical level, the notion of
"comprehensive security" canvassed in
the report. However, it is likely that
economic restraints would have made
it difficult for a government to imple-
ment many of the recommendations at
this time regardless of their desirability.
By the end of the year it was still
unclear how the new Bolger govern-
ment might depart from its predecessor
in its policy toward the Pacific Islands.
Foreign Minister Don McKinnon's
meeting with Ratu Mara at Auckland
airport did, however, signal the possi-
bility of a change in New Zealand's
approach to Fiji.
The events of 1990 confirmed that
the collective decisions of Pacific Island
states have begun to matter to larger
countries outside the region. The
United States had to take seriously the
collective concern about chemical
weapon destruction in the region.
Japan changed its behavior in gill-net
fishing in the Pacific, conscious of
island opinion mobilized against the
activity. Significantly, Japan an-
nounced the decision on the eve of the
annual meeting of the South Pacific
Forum. South Korea and Taiwan have
indicated that they are considering sim-
ilar action.
Australia was brought up short at
the South Pacific Forum when it real-
ized that it could no longer assume that
its particular concerns would prevail as
the regional consensus. The Forum
meeting confirmed a trend already evi-
dent: that a regional voice can be pow-
erful. In 1990 the Pacific Island states,
through a much-strengthened and
more effective South Pacific Forum,
demonstrated that they were collec-
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tively a major actor in the new matrix
of international relationships that
make up the contemporary interna-
tional system of the Pacific.
Although the events of 1990 suggest
a continuation in the interest and
involvement of major powers, and of
Australia and New Zealand, they also
suggest that the pattern and structure
of the international relations of the
region is changing. In particular, they
confirm four major trends: the decline
in the relative influence of Australia
and New Zealand; the institutionaliza-
tion of French and American regional
policies focused outside their own terri-
tories; the assertion of a stronger uni-
fied voice for the Pacific Island states;
and the rising influence of the People's
Republic of China, Taiwan, and Japan.
It confirms a move away from the
"ANZUS lake" and toward a more com-
plex system of international relations.
GREG FRY
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